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Quantity over quality: a political economy of ‘active labour market 
policy’ in the UK 
This article offers a critical evaluation of recent ‘active labour market policy’ 
(ALMP) initiatives in the UK, focusing on the coalition government’s Work 
Programme and its immediate antecedents. ALMP exemplifies a supply-side 
employment strategy, reorienting the state away from supporting labour demand, 
and towards promoting the ‘employability’ of individuals within existing labour 
market structures. The article locates the rationale this policy agenda within the 
wider politics of economic growth. Belying its status as a pioneer of ALMP, the 
UK spends very little on supply-side labour market interventions relative to other 
European countries. This can be explained with reference to the type of ALMP 
interventions prioritised in the UK, which in turn is explained by the growth 
model that ALMP is designed to sustain. The UK’s growth model requires an 
abundance of low-paid jobs in the labour-intense and volatile services sector. 
Ostensibly, ALMP fulfils this requirement by ensuring that individuals are 
immediately available for work, marginalising concerns about pay and job 
quality. Moreover, ALMP also serves to inculcate the desirability of certain 
behaviours at the individual level. The coalition government’s approach 
demonstrates an intensification rather than transformation of previous practice, 
indicative of its support for resurrecting the UK’s pre-crisis growth model. 
Keywords: employment; labour market; welfare-to-work; New Deal; Work 
Programme; coalition government; British politics; economic growth; political 
economy 
 
Introduction 
‘Active labour market policy’ (ALMP) has attained a high profile in the UK in recent 
years, as policy-makers ostensibly seek to generate an economic recovery, while 
correcting the real and perceived labour market problems caused by the severe recession 
of 2009. Many of the policy instruments encompassed by ALMP have long existed in 
some form, but became more central to economic statecraft in the UK in the 1990s as 
part of the turn to ‘supply-side economics’; indeed, it was not until this period that the 
notion of ALMP as a distinct form of policy intervention emerged. As such, ALMP 
encapsulates policy interventions designed to improve the employability of individuals, 
most specifically those seeking work. Conventionally, efforts to improve ‘human 
capital’ through training programmes are considered to be the archetypal ALMP 
intervention, yet interventions, especially in the UK, most often take the form of 
intermediary services to enable individuals to discover and prepare for employment 
opportunities. ALMP can be contrasted with interventions designed to increase the 
demand for labour; although supply-side interventions do not preclude demand-side 
interventions – they happily coincide in many polities – in the UK the emergence of 
ALMP can be associated with the disavowal of demand-side labour market 
interventions evident from the late 1970s onwards. 
The coalition government’s Work Programme represents the latest incarnation of 
active labour market policy in the UK (although it operates alongside several smaller-
scale initiatives, some of which have been carried over from the previous 
administration). The scheme offers intense support in finding employment for the long-
term unemployed (and some individuals previously classified as economically inactive); 
it is overseen by the Department of Work and Pensions but delivered by private 
contractors, largely on a ‘payment by results’ basis. The scheme has been presented as a 
radical departure from the previous government’s practice, but such a view offers only, 
at best, a partial picture. The Work Programme largely replicates the type of support 
available in Labour’s New Deal programmes, particularly the Flexible New Deal 
(FND), which was introduced during Labour’s third term in office. The Labour 
government did introduce some new schemes (or increase funding for existing schemes) 
following the economic downturn, which the coalition government has subsequently 
withdrawn, but the extent to which Labour’s post-crisis ALMP departed from pre-crisis 
practice should not be exaggerated. The Work Programme offers a relatively novel 
approach to the delivery of ALMP, in the form of largely privatised provision and a 
‘payments by results’ model, yet it is probably best characterised as as intensifying, 
rather than transforming, emerging practices evident in the FND. Moreover, the delivery 
of public services via the private sector, within a highly centralised administrative 
framework, was a feature of Labour’s wider economic statecraft. 
The article makes several, related arguments by way of critically evaluating the 
development of policy in this area. Firstly, considered in comparative perspective, the 
UK represents a very specific approach to ALMP, and spends far less than most other 
European countries on ALMP programmes – and yet should nevertheless be considered 
an exemplary case of ALMP, rather than an outlier. This is especially the case when 
ALMP is considered alongside attempts to introduce greater conditionality into the 
receipt of out-of-work benefits. Secondly, as noted above, the coalition government’s 
Work Programme represents a continuation of rather than departure from previous 
practice in this regard (albeit under a relatively novel delivery model), and as such is 
just as unlikely to fix some of the acute labour market problems evident in the UK than 
programmes established by the Labour government. Underpinning both of these 
arguments, and thirdly, is a novel perspective on the actual rationale for ALMP in the 
UK. Simply, ALMP is not primarily designed to fix most of the problems that are 
evident in the UK labour market, but rather to support a particular growth model by 
facilitating a low-paid and ‘flexible’ workforce. As such, what ALMP represents is as 
important as what it actually does. Despite the financial crisis and the severe recession 
which ensued in its wake, the coalition government fundamentally accepts the growth 
model it inherited from Labour, and has adopted an approach to ALMP in accordance 
with this position.  
The article is divided into three main sections. The first section offers an account 
of ALMP and the policy instruments contained within this area, and describes the main 
features of the UK’s approach to ALMP in comparative context. The second section 
offers a more detailed account of policy developments in the UK. Crucially, this section 
also relates ALMP to wider ‘welfare-to-work’ initiatives. In doing so, it presents 
evidence on one of the main contradictions of ALMP in the UK, that is, the difficulty of 
offering employment support to those that do not claim out-of-work benefits. The third 
section offers an original perspective on the rationale for the approach to ALMP evident 
in the UK. It shows that schemes such as the Work Programmes are not designed to 
address issues around low pay, endemic inequalities in labour market outcomes, and job 
quality, but rather designed to facilitate the maintenance of a large pool of workers 
willing – or resigned – to working in relatively poor conditions. 
What is active labour market policy? 
The development of active labour market policy is entirely consistent with, indeed 
exemplary of, the move away from Keynesian approaches to fiscal and economic 
management, and the associated ascendance of a neoliberal economic policy 
framework. As such, the emergence of ALMP coincided with the perspective that policy 
should be focused on improving the supply of labour, rather than on supporting demand 
for labour. New Labour’s ‘New Deal’ for unemployed people was presented as a 
progressive response to its predecessor’s approach, in that it was said to represent the 
‘enabling state’ rather than laissez-faire (Bevir, 2012, 46), but it largely entrenched the 
approach it inherited, albeit introducing specific programmes for some very 
disadvantaged groups, such as disabled people. New Labour therefore tacitly accepted 
that, in relation to employment, the task of the state is to ensure individuals are ready 
and available for work, without determining what type of jobs they are being readied 
for, and what level of income they might secure in the private market for labour.  
Individuals therefore had to be both correctly incentivised to accept available 
employment opportunities, and capable of adapting to potentially volatile labour market 
conditions once in employment. Unemployment is not a collective problem, rather 
primarily the responsibility of the unemployed themselves; the obvious corollary is that 
our own ability and proclivity to work is rendered the chief explanation for affluence or 
hardship, and the state’s role is to help us help ourselves in this regard (Newman, 2011). 
Generally speaking, ALMP is heavily pro-market, in that it accepts business strategies 
at face value and seeks to mould individual behaviour to suit these strategies. Although 
often presented as a way to improve economic performance in general, this pro-market 
orientation means that active labour market policy is also generally pro-cyclical; that is, 
interventions are not substantively designed to influence demand for labour, and instead 
seek to smooth rather than fundamentally alter the function of the labour market. 
ALMP generally takes two main forms. Firstly, support for individuals seeking 
work; the state will offer intermediary services so that job-searches are more effective. 
Secondly, support for individuals to improve or reorient their skills, to better match 
available job opportunities. The latter is probably closer to the conventional 
understanding of what a supply-side economic strategy looks like, yet the former is 
arguably now more dominant within actual policy interventions – certainly in the UK. A 
third form of intervention is the provision of employment subsidies. Although 
subsidised employment might seem to suggest an anti-market orientation, in practice 
subsidies are generally designed to, on the one hand, improve the employability of 
jobseekers by enabling them to gain experience of work for a limited period, and on the 
other hand, encourage employers not to create new jobs, but rather offer existing job 
opportunities to people that have experienced unemployment. Although ALMP operates 
through different institutional contexts in different countries, generally speaking 
participation in employment support programmes – the main direct instrument of 
ALMP – is linked to the receipt of out-of-work benefits. The receipt of benefits is 
conceived as a right which creates a duty for individuals to ensure they are able and 
available to work. The existence of out-of-work welfare entitlements can of course be 
seen to disincentivise work, and as such benefit levels are often reduced, and conditions 
attached to benefit receipt are often tightened, as constitutive aspects of supply-side 
labour market strategies (this will be discussed further in the next section). 
It is worth noting here that the UK spends significantly less on ALMP 
programmes – as defined and delineated by the European Commission – than most of its 
closest neighbours (Table 1). The UK spent around 0.4% of GDP on this policy area in 
2009 (the latest available comparable data for the UK), compared to, for instance, 1.4% 
in Belgium, 1% in France, 1% in Germany, 0.9% in Sweden, 0.8% in Spain, 1.5% in 
Denmark, and 1.2% in the Netherlands. There is also comparable data among European 
countries for expenditure on type of ALMP intervention. The variety of commitments 
made across different types of intervention indicates the relatively limited value of 
assessing headline spending rates alone. The UK spends around 0.3% of GDP on 
‘labour market services’ (primarily job-search services, but also job-matching and short-
term training programmes designed to facilitate successful job searches), equivalent to 
90% of its total spending on ALMP. Germany and the Netherlands both spend more 
than the UK on this type of intervention, but this spending represents only, respectively, 
38% and 32% of their total expenditure. Belgium, Denmark and France spend around 
the same as the UK on this type of intervention, but this spending represents only, 
respectively, 16%, 21% and 26% of total expenditure. Compared to only 4% of total 
expenditure for the UK, several European countries spend a significant portion on 
training programmes, including 60% in Austria, 37% in France and 36% in Germany. 
Belgium, and Sweden stand out for committing close to or more than 40% of ALMP 
expenditure to ‘employment incentives’ (primarily hiring subsidies for employers). Italy 
spends a similar proportion on employment incentives, as well as 45% of its ALMP 
budget on training, but its budget overall is actually similar in size to the UK’s. 
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
Similarly, while most European countries included here spend little on 
‘supported employment’ programmes (such as operating intermediate or ‘sheltered’ 
labour markets for individuals furthest away from formal employment), Denmark and 
the Netherlands spend, respectively, 0.7% of GDP (46% of total spending) and 0.5% of 
GDP (42% of total spending) on this type of intervention. Belgium spends 0.4% of GDP 
(26% of total spending) – that is, roughly the same as the UK spends on ALMP in 
general – on the direct creation of jobs in the public sector for those out of work. France 
also spends a significant portion of its ALMP budget on direct job creation, yet it also 
spends as much as the UK on job-search and related services, and more than Sweden 
and Denmark on training programmes It should be noted, however, that the status of 
direct job creation and supported employment as forms of ALMP is, at best, debatable; 
they may be nominally designed to improve the employability of participants, and 
reinforce the status of work as the primary route away from hardship, but they also 
enable individuals to ultimately avoid engaging with the mainstream labour market. 
 
Any characterisation of the UK’s approach to ALMP must therefore 
acknowledge both its very low level of expenditure and the concentration of expenditure 
on ‘labour market services’, such as job-search and job-matching services, and short-
term training programmes such as those focused on developing job-acquisition skills. 
UK spending on ALMP has actually fallen significantly since the mid-1980s, although 
this higher spending is largely explained by direct job creation in the public sector in 
this period, which has now been largely halted (Van Reenen, 2004, 473). The UK’s 
approach can be contrasted with high-spending countries such as Denmark and Sweden, 
who focus on, respectively, training programmes and employment subsidies – although 
both have increased the proportion of expenditure devoted to labour market services in 
recent years (see Berry, 2014; Bonoli, 2010; Breidhal and Clement, 2010; Cook, 2008) 
– and other low-spenders such as Italy, which focuses its limited resources mainly on 
training. Germany and France have also moved closer to the UK’s approach in recent 
years (Berry, 2014; Heyes, 2012; Vail, 2008) – although clearly they retain significant 
investment in training – but the European country seemingly most similar to the UK is 
the Netherlands. The Netherlands spends more on labour market services than other 
forms of intervention, with the exception of supported employment services. As 
suggested above, however, the Netherlands’ support for this type of intervention, which 
accounts for its very high level of overall ALMP expenditure, should perhaps be seen as 
an aspect of the country’s welfare provision, rather than its supply-side employment 
strategy. It has little bearing on its approach to enabling employment in the mainstream 
economy. 
It is worth noting the seemingly limited relationship between both the level and 
type of expenditure, and headline employment outcomes. For example, the UK is 
among the lowest spenders in Europe, but has relatively low unemployment. Belgium 
and Denmark are the highest spenders, but both have an unemployment rate similar to 
the UK’s – although Belgium has a higher rate of long-term unemployment than the 
UK, and Denmark has a lower rate. Similarly, Austria has a very low unemployment 
rate, but is not among the highest spenders on ALMP overall, whereas France spends 
almost as much as Austria on training programmes, but has a much higher 
unemployment rate. Germany and the Netherlands have very similar unemployment 
rates, although they spend vastly different amounts on interventions such as training.2 It 
is vital to acknowledge that ALMP does not, in any country, exist in isolation from 
wider economic statecraft, particularly other policy areas which impact the labour 
market, such as employment protection and the education system. Crucially, ALMP 
does not offer a ‘solution’ to a particular labour market ‘problem’ – as suggested by 
Giuliano Bonoli (2012) – but instead helps, in conjunction with other measures, to 
shape the nature of labour markets. Other countries have moved in the direction of the 
UK in terms of ALMP provision, yet retain commitments to earlier (and more 
expensive) forms of supply-side labour market intervention due to the 
institutionalisation of previous practice. There is evidence of direct policy learning 
across borders in Europe, in part due to the influence of the European Union, but also 
evidence of countries resisting the kind of labour market forms that tend to be 
associated with the UK’s approach to ALMP (Heyes, 2004). We can best understand the 
UK’s approach to ALMP, therefore, not simply by focusing on what is done under the 
ALMP banner, but also on what ALMP interventions replace or substitute. It is partly 
because the UK never firmly entrenched demand-side labour market interventions that it 
did not, and does not, invest strongly in more intensive forms of support for human 
capital development. The state is not well-placed to organise vocational training, for 
instance, if it is relatively absent from the process of creating skills needs through public 
investment and an active industrial policy. 
The development of active labour market policy in the UK 
The UK’s approach to active labour market policy is geared towards providing a range 
of services that enable unemployed people to find work relatively quickly. Services 
include job-search and job-matching, job-acquisition training (interview skills, CV-
writing, etc.), basic literacy and IT education, and in some cases work-related 
counselling. These services have come packaged in various forms over the past two 
decades. Generally they are delivered centrally by the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP), although some local authorities also offer basic employment support 
services. Initially, newly unemployed people deal with the DWP agency Jobcentre Plus 
(JCP), which administers most out-of-work benefit expenditure (principally Jobseekers’ 
Allowance, JSA) and offers limited employment support services. If unemployment 
persists (typically for six months or a year), individuals are entitled to the more intense 
forms of employment support. 
The New Deal, introduced by the Labour government in 1998, represented an 
attempt to broaden the approach of UK active market policy away from simply job-
search and related services’, although also represented a significant expansion of 
existing forms of provision (Van Reenen, 2004). The policy was aimed primarily at 
young people: The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) offered people aged under 25 
that had been unemployed for six months intense job-search support for four months, 
generally through JCP. If this programme failed to lead to employment, participants 
were offered one of four options: full-time education or training for a year, subsidised 
employment in the private sector for six months (with some support for on-the-job 
training), subsidised employment in the voluntary sector, or a six-month public sector 
work placement via the Environmental Task Force. Participants continued to receive 
JSA during their time on the New Deal (or slightly higher payments if in subsidised 
private sector employment). Participation in the New Deal was mandatory, if 
individuals wished to continue to receive JSA – there was ‘no fifth option’. A similar 
programme was available to people aged 25 or over that had been unemployed for 18 
months, and there were tailored New Deal programmes for older workers, disabled 
people and lone parents. 
It is clear that the vast majority of New Deal expenditure was committed to job-
search and related services. By the end of New Labour’s second term in office, almost 
90% of the UK’s ALMP expenditure was directed to ‘labour market services’ (a similar 
proportion to the present time, although the level of spending on such services was 
higher, within a higher ALMP budget overall). During New Labour’s first term, 
expenditure on employment subsidies had risen noticeably, although this commitment 
was not sustained, and little increase in training investment is evident from expenditure 
data.3 Rachel Nicholls and W. John Morgan’s assessment of NDYP found that over 
time the policy was re-focused ‘away from skills investment [and] towards shorter-term 
interventions and an implied philosophy that “any job is a good job”’. They also found 
‘a significant departure away from encouraging employers to invest in the intermediate 
level skills of New Deal employees’ (2009, 93), and concluded that ‘the primary 
purpose of training programmes and active labour market intervention for welfare 
recipients is to ensure the pace and progress of participants into work and that any 
educational element or advancement in work is secondary’ (2009, 81). Similarly there is 
evidence that employment subsidies were largely unsuccessful in leading to sustainable 
employment opportunities for participants (House of Commons Education and 
Employment Committee, 2001). This is associated with the reliance on the public sector 
to create subsidised posts – also identified as a problem in other countries’ subsidy 
programmes (see Dorsett, 2006; Gilbert and Besharov, 2011).  
Nevertheless, there is strong evidence of cost-effectiveness regarding New Deal 
spending on labour market intermediation services in the UK, especially job-search 
services. Above all, participants in employability programmes in the UK tend to find 
work relatively quickly (Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion, 2012; Wilson, 
2013). As suggested in the previous section, however, there is a strongly cyclical 
element here. The New Deal was conceived by Labour in the aftermath of recession in 
the early 1990s, but by the time of its implementation, the UK economy was growing 
very strongly, leading to strong market-led labour demand (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
2000). This has several implications: firstly, the existence of relatively abundant 
employment opportunities inflates the success of job-search services, as they lead to 
jobs that may have been obtained anyway. Secondly, a well-performing labour market 
undermines the rationale for more intense ALMP interventions such as training and 
employment subsidies. Thirdly, and related to this, it means that the participants for 
these more intense support programmes tend to be less employable than was otherwise 
envisaged (because the more employable prospective participants have found jobs more 
quickly than expected), therefore undermining the outcomes of these programmes. 
Furthermore, the fact that the economy is growing strongly, creating a large 
quantity of jobs, does not necessarily mean that quality jobs are being created. There is 
substantial evidence, therefore, of work/welfare ‘cycling’ among New Deal participants. 
Almost 70% of new JSA claimants have claimed the benefit previously (McCollum, 
2013). And crucially, cycling is more likely to occur in buoyant labour market 
conditions. In the UK, London and the South East have both the highest employment 
rates, and the highest rates of cycling. This may be because people have less incentive 
to remain in work, knowing that they will be able to find another job quickly. A more 
persuasive explanation, however, is that labour market buoyancy in the UK in recent 
years has been associated with increasing employment insecurity, predominantly in the 
services sector. Most cycling is involuntary (McCollum, 2013). John Adams and Ray 
Thomas’ (2007) assessment of the success of the New Deal in Scotland also finds the 
same association between cycling and labour market buoyancy. Unemployment in 
Scotland receded under New Labour, but primarily in areas where it was already lowest. 
The areas with the lowest exits from unemployment also had the highest entry rates into 
unemployment, and vice versa. 
In 2007, the Labour government under the leadership of Gordon Brown 
ostensibly abandoned the New Deal after commissioning David Freud to report on UK 
ALMP and wider welfare-to-work strategies. Freud’s work was framed by then Work 
and Pensions Secretary John Hutton’s stated belief that many benefit claimants in the 
UK exhibited a ‘can’t work, won’t work’ and ‘something for nothing’ culture (as quoted 
in Grover, 2007).  Recognising that many unemployed people find new work quickly, 
Freud recommended a stricter bifurcation between JCP services for the newly 
unemployed, and privately-run services for the long-term unemployed and 
economically inactive. However, rather than recommending more intense forms of 
support for the hardest cases, Freud’s plan involved withdrawing the bulk of spending 
dedicated to training and employment subsidies, and instead strengthening benefit 
conditionality, especially for lone parents (see Freud, 2007; Grover, 2007). Freud’s plan 
was introduced in 2009 as the Flexible New Deal. By then, however, the recession had 
hit and Labour had already re-introduced, separately, elements of the original New Deal 
– primarily employment subsidies in the form of the Future Jobs Fund (FJF). The FJF 
offered a subsidised job for six months, of at least 25 hours per week, paid at the 
national minimum wage (with a maximum government contribution of £6,500 per job). 
Subsidised jobs had to demonstrate a ‘community benefit’. The FJF was heavily 
criticised for its reliance upon the public sector – although this was partly by design – 
and has subsequently been abolished (Fishwick et al, 2011). The Labour government 
also significantly increased investment in training after 2008 through Train to Gain 
(TtG), initially established in 2006 by the Learning and Skills Council (and, again, 
subsequently abolished by the coalition government). TtG subsidised employers’ 
expenditure on training, although evaluations suggested only limited employer 
engagement and demand (National Audit Office, 2009; Lanning and Lawton, 2012). 
Introduced in 2011, with Freud having been appointed a Conservative peer and 
DWP minister after the 2010 election, the Work Programme represents the coalition 
government’s flagship contribution to ALMP. After a year in receipt of JSA, or nine 
months for those aged 18-24, employment support for unemployed people is handed 
over to Work Programme providers (some people classified as economically inactive 
are also eligible to enter the programme). These providers are private companies 
commissioned centrally by DWP, although provision is organised regionally rather than 
nationally (generally speaking there are two providers per region, although some large 
regions are divided into two or more sub-regions). As planned as part of FND, the Work 
Programme therefore establishes a strict divide between JCP support for the newly 
unemployed, and privatised provision for the long-term unemployed. Work Programme 
providers focus almost exclusively on job-search services, and related services such as 
training in job-acquisition skills. Given that the Work Programme is delivered entirely 
by private contractors, issues around commercial confidentiality mean it is difficult to 
gain a comprehensive picture of the kinds of support available to Work Programme 
participants; the system is based on a ‘black box’ whereby DWP funds providers to 
deliver whatever forms of support providers deem effective – they are paid (largely) by 
results, irrespective of methods. However, we can be reasonably certain that job-search 
and related services dominate the Work Programme, partly because of the limiting 
funding made available by the coalition government and partly because of the small 
volume of work sub-contracted to specialist providers – sub-contracting by ‘prime’ 
providers to specialist, voluntary sector bodies was supposed to be one of the hallmarks 
of the Work Programme’s delivery model (Fothergill, 2013, 63). 
As noted above, Work Programme providers are paid largely by results – this 
model represents a substantive difference between the Work Programme and FND 
(Rees et al, 2011). The ‘result’ is not simply the obtainment of a job by a participant; 
full payment usually depends on employment being maintained for at least 18 months 
over a two-year period. However, it does not depend on a single position being 
sustained over this time – providers can obtain full payment by placing participants in 
several temporary jobs consecutively. Interestingly, Ian Mulheirn (2011), former 
director of Social Market Foundation and one of the architects of the Work Programme 
model, had warned, before the policy was implemented, that the financial model chosen 
by the government would prove unviable for smaller, specialist providers due to the 
outcome risk they would be asked to shoulder. Partly as a result of this, partial up-front 
payments to providers were introduced, on the eve of policy implementation, thereby 
further diluting the differences between the coalition government and its predecessor in 
terms of ALMP. 
In its first two years of operation, the Work Programme performed below 
expectations. The measure devised by the Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion 
(CESI, 2013), based on participants obtaining employment for a year, shows the 
programme has performed consistently below a minimum performance level (that is, an 
estimation of the ‘deadweight’ level). Performance improved throughout 2012, but 
CESI argues that it plateaued in 2013. Recent data published by DWP shows that only 
48,000 full ‘sustainment’ payments have been made to Work Programme providers – 
representing just over 3% of cases referred to the Work Programme since June 2011 
(Rawlinson, 2014). CESI (2013) suggests that this is due to the sluggish nature of the 
economic recovery, with fewer jobs being created. However, jobs growth has in fact 
been remarkably robust over recent years, and was even stronger during 2011 and 2012 
than it has been since overall growth returned on a consistent basis in mid-2013 (Berry, 
2013, 18). We can plausibly speculate that the performance of the labour market means 
that Work Programme participants are less immediately employable than providers 
anticipated – the same dynamic that appeared to afflict the performance of training and 
subsidy schemes in the New Deal. Indeed, James Rees, Adam Whitworth and Elle 
Carter (2014) have demonstrated that ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ are ‘systematically 
embedded’ within the Work Programme’s delivery model, helping to explain its poor 
performance to date. Creaming describes a focus by providers on participants they can 
most easily place into work, and parking describes a lack of support for those furthest 
from the labour market. The problem for providers is that examples of the former have 
been far less prevalent than the latter in the Work Programme’s early years. But this 
evidence should also invite reflection on whether we should in fact consider the Work 
Programme to be failing, even if it is struggling on its own terms. While inherent flaws 
in the ability of the Work Programme to deliver secure employment for those unable to 
find work are worth exploring, as interesting is the prospect that the Work Programme 
acts to reinforce wider labour market practices – and that it is performing this role quite 
adequately. This will be discussed further in the next section. 
It should be noted that the coalition government has also reintroduced 
employment subsidies, despite heavily criticising its predecessor in this regard. The 
‘Youth Contract’ encompasses marginal hiring subsidies for unemployed 18-24 year-
olds; it is not intended that new jobs will be created, but rather that the subsidies will 
make young applicants more attractive to employers. Initially available only to Work 
Programme participants, it was subsequently expanded to all young people that had 
been claiming JSA for more than six months. The programme has suffered from 
extremely low take-up rates, with less than 5,000 placements made, from 160,000 
available, in the first year of its operation (DWP, 2013b). The coalition has also offered 
greater support for people in receipt of out-of-work benefits to become self-employed, 
through the New Enterprise Allowance (NEA) (which essentially continues JSA 
payments for the first six months of self-employment) and start-up loans of around 
£5,000, offered on commercial terms. Ian Brinkley and Naomi Clayton (2011) of the 
Work Foundation have, however, been highly critical of the NEA. Most subsidised 
entrepreneurs will enter industries with very low barriers to entry – where margins for 
existing businesses are extremely tight, meaning the subsidy carries a significant risk of 
displacement. These sectors also have very high failure rates, and there is little evidence 
that a brief experience of self-employment improves individuals’ employability more 
generally. There is therefore ‘a great risk of swapping one form of precarious, low 
income existence for another with no long-term benefit’ (Brinkley and Clayton, 2011, 
49). 
Of far greater significance to understanding the coalition’s approach to supply-
side labour market interventions are efforts to increase benefit conditionality, and 
sanctions for those that do not satisfy these conditions. Although nominally separate to 
ALMP under a strict definition, clearly employment support services and the use of 
conditions attached to benefit receipt are both designed to encourage unemployed 
people to take up opportunities to work. Benefit conditionality has been used 
extensively in the UK and Netherlands, and also Denmark, Germany and Sweden to 
some extent (see Bruttel and Sol, 2006; Grigg and Evans, 2010; Kananen, 2012). More 
directly, of course, one of the conditions of benefit receipt is that individuals – after a 
certain length of time out of work – participate in schemes such as the Work 
Programme. This compulsion was also explicit in the New Deal. While the Work 
Programme and the New Deal channel individuals into any job, irrespective of quality, 
the threat of having benefits suspended or removed entirely ensures that people co-
operate with this process. Of course, conditionality predates these programmes; the need 
for unemployed people to demonstrate substantive jobseeking activity is a longstanding 
aspect of UK welfare practice. The coalition government has strengthened 
conditionality in advance of entering the Work Programme by introducing Mandatory 
Work Activity (MWA), a scheme which primarily consists of four-week work 
placements of up to 30 hours per week (delivered by private contractors). The scheme 
became notorious when one claimant, Cait Reilly, took legal action against the 
government for incorrectly compelling her to undertake an unpaid work placement in 
Poundland (as reported on the BBC website on 12 February 2013). In the first year of 
MWA, 46% of those referred to the programme by Jobcentre Plus either gave up JSA 
voluntarily as a result, or had it removed when they failed to complete their placement 
(DWP, 2013a). The Labour government had already piloted a similar initiative before 
2010. Interestingly, Labour had signalled an intent to relax some sanctions in 2009 
(Newman, 2011, 92), although has since 2010, in opposition, largely concurred with the 
coalition government’s ‘tough’ sanctions regime (see Byrne, 2013; Helm, 2013). In 
April 2014, the coalition also announced plans to introduce its Help to Work (HTW) 
scheme – for benefit claimants that failed to find a job through the Work Programme. 
Through HTW, people who have been unemployed for around three years will lose JSA 
unless they agree to a six-month ‘community work placement’, attend a JCP site every 
day to report on jobseeking activity, or enter an intensive JCP engagement programme 
(reported in the media as a ‘training’ scheme, although the government’s own website 
describes the this scheme as a largely advice-based service aimed at improving job-
acquisition skills) (BBC, 2014; HM Government, 2014). The scheme was piloted in 
2013, and an evaluation found that participants were only 2-4 per cent less likely to be 
claiming benefits at the end of the programme than non-participant JSA claimants 
(DWP, 2014). 
There is little evidence on the impact of sanctions on employment in the UK. 
The use of sanctions has been assessed in several European countries – mainly 
Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Norway and Denmark – and is associated with 
high levels of short-term benefit exit and job entry. However, sanctions are also 
associated with poorer quality, lower-paid and unsustainable employment over the long-
term, and even higher crime rates (Arni, Lalive and van Ours, 2009; Grigg and Evans, 
2010). Importantly, unlike most other European countries, the UK’s sanctions regime 
applies equally to the youngest benefit recipients (Cooke, 2013). The potential 
effectiveness of sanctions in the UK is undermined, firstly, by the fact that most benefit 
recipients are unaware of the nature of the conditionality regime – it is therefore not an 
important influence on individuals’ labour market engagement (Grigg and Evans, 2010; 
Newman, 2011, 97-8). Sanctions are also undermined, secondly, by the fact that the UK 
has very low claimant rates for out-of-work benefits (Table 2 compares non-claimant 
rates for the UK and several, comparable European countries). Crucially, non-receipt of 
out-of-work benefits means that individuals are not available to participate in 
employment support programmes. It is a paradox of ALMP that the inculcation of a 
duty to work, to ease the burden of welfare entitlements on the state, is dependent on 
unemployed people actually claiming these entitlements. However, we should be 
cautious about taking this apparent flaw at face value; the next section will argue that 
the value of employment support programmes may not actually depend on widespread 
participation. 
 
[TABLE 2] 
What is active labour market policy for? 
It is far too simplistic to say that the purpose of active labour market policy is to 
improve the performance of the labour market in any straightforward sense – yet even 
critics of the UK’s approach to ALMP tend to unproblematically accept the apparent 
link between ALMP and increasing employment, even if sceptical of its effectiveness, 
or disapproving of either the methods employed or narrow view of labour market 
performance this entails. As noted above, the UK has a lower rate than most comparable 
countries – the same applies to long-term unemployment, and youth unemployment 
(albeit to a lesser extent).5 However, this success masks myriad labour market problems. 
Firstly, while youth unemployment in the UK may compare reasonably favourably to 
other countries, the UK has a very high, and stubborn, proportion of young people not in 
employment, education or training (NEET) (ONS, 2013d). Secondly, the UK has a large 
under-employment rate, that is, part-time workers who would like to find full-time 
employment (ONS, 2013b). Thirdly, there has been a dramatic rise in ‘precarious’ 
employment, typified by involuntary temporary employment, and in particular ‘zero 
hours’ contracts (ONS, 2013e). Fourthly, there are endemic regional inequalities in 
labour market performance (ONS, 2013a). Fifthly, the UK has a skills ‘under-
utilisation’ problem, whereby individuals are unable to find employment which matches 
their educational attainment (Wright and Sissons, 2012). Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, earnings have been stagnant, with real wages in the bottom half of the 
earnings distribution not having grown for more than a decade, and even slightly 
declined over this period (Plunkett, 2011). 
These specific problems clearly cannot be reduced to supply-side issues, that is, 
problems of individual employability – and therefore the Work Programme (and similar 
interventions) is neither equipped nor designed to resolve them. However, while these 
problems were exacerbated by the economic downturn, they have long been evident to 
some extent in the UK labour market (Berry, 2013). And crucially, the UK economy 
was able to demonstrate very strong economic growth in the 1990s and 2000s despite 
their presence. It is worth reflecting, therefore, on what model of economic growth 
prevailed in the UK over this period. The 1980s onwards saw domestic consumption 
become increasingly important to economic growth in the UK. Paradoxically, however, 
as suggested above, this increased dependence on household consumption for sustaining 
economic growth coincided with a relative decline in the role of earned income in 
providing for disposable income. In its place came increasing indebtedness at the 
household level, and the release of equity enabled by a booming housing market. 
Earnings from employment of course remained decisive in funding consumption – but 
the increased role for consumer and mortgage borrowing (and growth of the financial 
sector) enabled the growth model to pacify the potentially devastating stagnation in 
earnings for a remarkably long period of time. This growth model is of course 
associated with, and shaped by, a particular form of economic statecraft, influenced by 
neoliberal ideology, in which the state eschews a Keynesian approach to managing 
demand (and supporting labour demand) through monetary and fiscal policy and instead 
promotes the ‘liberalisation’ of the private sector (see Crouch, 2009; Berry, 2013; Hay, 
2013; Thompson, 2013).  
High levels of employment could be sustained because the growth model was 
characterised by the rise of the services sector – more labour-intense than sectors such 
as manufacturing, but also, generally speaking, requiring lower levels of human capital. 
The services sector is also more volatile, requiring a more ‘flexible’ workforce. Bank 
lending became increasingly focused on the housing market, further undermining the 
funds available for long-term investment in capital-intense industries. More generally, 
the ‘financialisation’ of corporate practice meant that short-term returns took 
precedence over long-term investment, providing for the ‘low road’ business model 
adopted by many firms, and incentivising concentration in industries with low barriers 
to entry. This helps to explain the abundance of jobs in this period, albeit often low-paid 
and insecure jobs – high employment therefore helped to mitigate the risk that low 
earnings posed to a consumption-driven growth model (with the state increasingly 
supplementing earnings through tax credits). Trade union efforts to maintain higher 
levels of remuneration were undermined by the liberalisation of employment protection 
undertaken by the Conservative governments of the 1980s, largely maintained by the 
Labour governments of the late 1990s and 2000s. 
The Work Programme is evidence that the coalition government accepts this 
inheritance. The approach of course scales back even further the limited investment by 
the UK in offering training opportunities for people out of work. ALMP, in conjunction 
with benefit conditionality, serves to ensure as many individuals as possible are 
available to work, therefore dampening demands for employers to increase wages or 
enhance job quality, and maintaining the attractiveness of labour-intense industries. As 
Ines Newman (2011, 93) suggests, ALMP in the UK typifies the dual impact of 
neoliberalism on economic statecraft, in that it facilitates both a ‘roll out’ and ‘roll back’ 
of the frontiers of the state. On the one hand, ALMP clearly designates the 
responsibility of individuals themselves in terms of securing employment and more 
generally alleviating hardship. ALMP interventions, especially the Work Programme, 
are designed to facilitate more effective engagement with the labour market – not to 
shape the market itself. On the other hand, ALMP increases the reach of the state into 
the realm of the micro-behaviour and lifestyle choices of individuals, facilitating the 
entrenchment of work as the primary focus of everyday life. It is worth noting that, 
despite the rhetorical emphasis placed by the government on economic ‘rebalancing’, 
the services sector now makes up a greater proportion of the UK economy than before 
the financial crisis – it has risen from 77% in the third quarter of 2007 to 79% in the 
third quarter of 2013 (ONS, 2013c). This has had implications for the type of jobs that 
have been created since the crisis: the Resolution Foundation reports that, overall, 
190,000 jobs were created in low-paying sectors between 2008 and 2012 (defined as 
sectors where median pay is lower than two-thirds of the national median), while 
169,000 jobs were lost in middle-paying sectors (Plunkett, Hurrell and Whittaker, 
2014).  
It becomes necessary therefore to reconsider what ALMP in the UK is for. 
Ostensibly, ALMP is designed to increase the proportion of people in work. More 
precisely, however, it is designed to ensure people are immediately available to work – 
an objective which problematises the notion that employment policy should aim to 
improve human capital, and marginalises concerns about the nature of the jobs 
individuals are expected to accept. It is understandable that the effectiveness of 
interventions such as the Work Programme is considered in terms of how many long-
term unemployed people have been placed in employment as a result of participating, 
especially given participants are in large part drawn from very disadvantaged social 
groups, and given that such schemes are justified by policy-makers in terms of their 
ability to deliver such outcomes. However, we must also acknowledge that ALMP in 
the UK serves to facilitate, and even legitimate, a particular type of labour market, upon 
which a wider model for economic growth rests. That relatively few people find 
(secure) employment directly through ALMP interventions in the UK does not detract 
from its role in both inculcating the desirability and necessity of certain behaviours at 
the individual level, and helping to maintain a downward pressure on pay and work 
conditions by sustaining the (potential) supply of labour. Other European countries 
pursue different growth models to the UK, necessitating different labour market forms. 
In conjunction with other supply-side and demand-side measures, ALMP therefore 
exists for different purposes in different domestic contexts. This helps to account for the 
differences in levels and types of ALMP expenditure between the UK and the rest of 
Europe (and of course among continental European countries, albeit to a lesser extent). 
However, these differences are not static. The UK’s embrace of a certain form of 
supply-side intervention, and the notion of ALMP, is constitutive of an economic 
strategy which is to some extent being replicated across Europe; investment in ALMP 
interventions such as training and employment subsidies are, generally speaking, 
declining as a result. 
Conclusion 
Compared to most other European countries, the UK spends relatively little on active 
labour market policy. This may be somewhat surprising given the emphasis placed on a 
supply-side economic strategy, typified by attempts to improve employability at the 
individual level, by UK policy-makers since the 1990s. Two main explanations for this 
are possible. Firstly, the UK has a relatively high (and fast growing) employment rate, 
negating the need for employment support. It should also be noted that many 
unemployed people do not claim the benefits that would obligate them to participate in 
ALMP schemes, although this problematises, to some extent, the notion that the UK has 
a well-performing labour market. Secondly, ALMP in the UK is heavily focused on 
relatively inexpensive job-search services, and related services designed to offer a point 
of intermediation between individuals and the labour market. More expensive 
interventions, such as training programmes aimed at enhancing human capital, are not a 
significant feature of the ALMP landscape in the UK. There is little legacy of 
established practice in this regard. Moreover, the state is not well-placed to pursue 
supply-side human capital improvements given the conspicuous absence of a strategy 
for shaping demand for labour. 
Neither of these factors, however, can be taken simply at face value; they arise 
from the wider model for economic growth, and associated form of statecraft, with 
which ALMP must be associated. The UK economy has reoriented towards the services 
sector, and at the same time become far more dependent on household consumption to 
drive growth. The services sector is both more labour-intense and volatile than most 
other sectors, requiring a lower-paid and more ‘flexible’ workforce. Consumer debt and 
a booming housing market have in recent years helped to pacify the contradiction 
between a dependence on consumption, and downward pressure on earnings. Supply-
side labour market interventions are required therefore not to ‘upskill’ the workforce, 
but rather to ensure that as many people as possible are immediately available to take on 
poor quality jobs. ALMP acts to smooth the function of the labour market in this regard, 
but in combination with a wider welfare-to-work agenda, serves to compel individuals 
to participate in the labour market as it stands, and reinforces the notion that 
unemployment is an individual problem, rather than a collective problem. 
In this sense, notwithstanding its innovate delivery model, the coalition 
government’s Work Programme represents a continuation and intensification of the 
approach to ALMP evident under its predecessor. Finding a job – any job – is 
prioritised above all other considerations. The Work Programme also offers a highly 
centralised and privatised approach to ALMP, again replicating longstanding features of 
economic statecraft in the UK. The coalition government’s ALMP leaves largely 
untouched a host of labour market problems manifest below the headline employment 
and unemployment rates. In fact, evidence suggests the Work Programme has been 
largely unsuccessful in placing participants in any job, even the low-paying and poor-
quality jobs now being created. However, that relatively few people find employment 
directly through ALMP interventions does not undermine its overall purpose in terms of 
inculcating the desirability and necessity of certain behaviours at the individual level, 
and helping to maintain a downward pressure on pay and work conditions by sustaining 
the (potential) supply of labour. This does not mean, however, that the coalition 
government has arrived at a kind of policy ‘equilibrium’ whereby its approach to ALMP 
is effective, even justifiable, in that it combines with a wider strategy for economic 
growth. The financial crisis and subsequent recession exposed the flaws in the UK’s 
pre-crisis growth model, and insofar as the Work Programme and related schemes 
support the resurrection of this model, they also serve to invite into the UK economy the 
risks associated with the contradictions between earnings stagnation and consumption-
driven growth. 
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Notes 
1. Eurostat data (accessed 20 January 2014). 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/labour_market/labour_market_po
licy/main_tables. 
2. See note 1. 
3. See note 1. 
4. Eurostat data (accessed 20 January 2014). 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/
data/main_tables. There is no data on claimant rates in Germany available. 
5. See note 4. 
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Table 1. Active labour market policy expenditure by type of intervention, selected 
European countries (2009). 
  Labour 
market 
services 
Training 
Employment 
incentives 
Supported 
employment 
Direct 
job 
creation 
Start-up 
incentives 
TOTAL 
Austria 
%GDP 0.2 0.5 0.1 neg 0.1 neg 
0.8 
%TOTAL 21.7 60.5 6.3 4.8 5.9 0.7 
n/a 
Belgium 
%GDP 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 neg 
1.4 
%TOTAL 15.5 12.4 35.9 9.9 26.1 0.3 
n/a 
Denmark 
%GDP 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 * * 
1.5 
%TOTAL 21.0 20.1 13.0 45.9 * * 
n/a 
France 
%GDP 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
1.0 
%TOTAL 26.2 36.7 9.8 7.7 15.8 3.9 
n/a 
Germany 
%GDP 0.4 0.4 0.1 neg 0.1 0.1 
1.0 
%TOTAL 37.5 35.8 10.4 3.5 5.9 6.8 
n/a 
Italy 
%GDP neg 0.2 0.2 * neg neg 
0.4 
%TOTAL 9.0 44.8 39.5 * 1.5 5.0 
n/a 
Ireland 
%GDP 0.2 0.3 neg neg 0.2 * 
0.8 
%TOTAL 23.4 39.4 5.7 1.4 30.1 * 
n/a 
Netherlands 
%GDP 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.5 * * 
1.2 
%TOTAL 32.2 10.9 14.8 42.1 * * 
n/a 
Poland 
%GDP 0.1 neg 0.2 0.2 neg 0.1 
0.6 
%TOTAL 15.7 6.3 26.0 34.1 4.3 13.5 
n/a 
Spain 
%GDP 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
0.8 
%TOTAL 16.9 22.4 28.7 9.2 10.2 12.5 
n/a 
Sweden 
%GDP 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 * neg 
0.9 
%TOTAL 23.9 7.1 42.2 25.5 * 1.4 
n/a 
United 
Kingdom 
%GDP 0.3 neg neg neg neg * 
0.4 
%TOTAL 89.5 4.2 3.4 1.8 1.0 * 
n/a 
Source: European Commission.1  
Note: neg = negligible; * = data not available. 
  
Table 2. Proportion of unemployed people not in receipt of out-of-work benefits by age 
and unemployment duration, selected European countries (2012). 
 
Unemployment duration (months) 
<1 1-2 3-5 6-11 12-17 18-23 24-47 ≥48 
Denmark 
15-24 yrs 85 75 68 68 70 * * * 
25-64 yrs 27 16 13 10 * * * * 
France 
15-24 yrs 40 34 * 21 23 * 32 * 
25-64 yrs 24 14 * 10 11 * 14 21 
Italy 
15-24 yrs 48 47 42 40 40 34 44 58 
25-64 yrs 43 41 35 35 44 35 45 60 
Netherlands 
15-24 yrs 94 94 90 90 78 * * * 
25-64 yrs 73 49 40 36 43 44 61 63 
Spain 
15-24 yrs 78 57 39 26 21 * * * 
25-64 yrs 43 21 13 7 9 * * * 
Sweden 
15-24 yrs 39 42 30 19 16 33 18 * 
25-64 yrs 17 12 12 9 10 10 11 14.5 
United 
Kingdom 
15-24 yrs 93 74 61 58 61 52 40 33 
25-64 yrs 83 66 53 53 51 60 42 37 
Source: European Commission.4  
Note: * = data not available. 
 
